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ON COVEY OLIVER
OSCAR SCHACHTER t

Covey Oliver and I first became acquainted in 1942 when we
were "economic warriors" in World War II. One does not forget the early impressions of someone as distinctive as Covey Oliver
in the largely gray world of Washington bureaucracy. He had
been plucked from Texas academia mainly because he knew Spanish from his Laredo upbringing, and only incidentally because he
was summa cum laude twice over at the University of Texas (and
that was long before grade inflation). I must confess that as a New
York provincial, I was surprised to find my colleague from Laredo
and Austin remarkably knowledgeable about the world and intellectual currents. (Later I came to know other Texans of impressive cultural breadth and interests, and I always thought of Covey
as the prototype.) Covey brought to his official work characteristic
zest and exuberance. He was fascinated with the ways in which
words were manipulated and deployed, and he quickly learned to
master and play upon Washington jargon. I had in that early
period of our friendship only a glimpse of how "simpatico" he was
to the Latino personality. In later years, as I met diplomats, scholars, and lawyers from Latin America and the Iberian peninsula,
they would frequently ask that their affectionate regards be conveyed to Professor Oliver, a request generally accompanied by a
happy recollection of his cheerful ebullience and personal warmth.
These aspects of his personality were even evident when he
addressed himself to the perennial problems of legal philosophy and
world order. Like Karl Llewellyn and Thurman Arnold (both of
whom shaped his legal thought), he did not feel obliged to use the
conventional abstract language of jurisprudence when his points
could be made in lively and concrete terms. At times he indulges
in an American legal argot that may baffle foreign readers but is
like a fresh breeze in the international law journals. One of the
pleasures of reading and listening to him is the way he moves from
particular facts to general ideas, from down-to-earth cases to the
higher reaches of jurisprudential doctrine. Like his personality, his
philosophic mind is amiable and congenial, hospitable to many
points of view, quick to see the special merit of each. He draws
upon Kelsen and McDougal, Jessup and Edwin Dickinson, Owen
Roberts and Frankfurter-and he reaches out to political philosof Professor of Law, Columbia University. B.S.S. 1936, City College of the City
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phers and just plain politicians. The result is not a mere eclecticism, but a distinctive "Oliverian" analysis in which a variety of
-views are marshalled to support a thesis and a strongly-held view of
public policy.
There is never any doubt where Covey Oliver stands on issues
of public policy. He has spoken out consistently in favor of a
national policy that would recognize our common interests and
shared values with the rest of the world. He fought senatorial
efforts to limit treaty-making power; he attacked the denigrators of
international law (particularly George Kennan and Hans Morgenthau) for their inadequate conception of natural interest; he
advocated, with eloquence and hard facts, increased economic aid
to the less developed countries and the eradication of the inequalities that produce violence and repression within countries and
across national lines. His experience in high government officeespecially concerned with Latin America-enabled him to see how
deeply felt were the demands for equal rights and economic wellbeing, and how important it was for the United States to heed those
demands.
There is still another facet of Covey Oliver's career that cannot
go without mention. This is his abiding fascination with the craft
of the lawyer. In our many discussions over the years in panels of
the American Society of International Law, in meetings on the
Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States, and in bull sessions, he brought us down to particular
cases, to the techniques of courts and advocates, "to the underbrush
of international agreements, of foreign office practice," and to the
ways in which legal doctrine was manipulated for political ends.
In contrast to most international lawyers, he has been actively
concerned with other fields of law, including conflicts of laws, constitutional law, taxation, insurance, and admiralty. Long before
"transnational law" became a popular notion in American law
schools, his teaching and writing exemplified its application. He
took delight in reaching out for cases and ideas in other fields of
law and in neighboring disciplines and thereby stimulated the rest
of us to fresh ways of looking at our international law problems.
One can easily see why he has been a great teacher. His many
students will attest to that. I would add, on the evidence of some
who worked with me and who later attained high office in their
countries, that he left with them not only the skills of the lawyer's
craft, but a sense of the importance of law and of lawyers in the
efforts to bring order and decency to the world. I believe that it
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is as a teacher, even more than as a diplomat or high official, that
Covey Oliver has made-and will continue to make-a lasting contribution to the attainment of a decent world order. And it is
as a genuine human being-a real "mensch"-that he holds a lasting
place in the affection of those who have been lucky enough to know
and work with him.

